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NONTRADITIONAL VENTURE CAPITAL:
AN ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT
STRATEGY FOR ALASKA
This Note begins by analyzing Alaska’s current economic posi-
tion and the reasons behind the state’s lack of traditional ven-
ture capital sources.  The author describes both traditional and
nontraditional mechanisms of venture capital, finally conclud-
ing that Alaska should adopt a nontraditional form of venture
capital in order to spur economic growth in rural communities
and in slow-growth industries.  Such a fund can have a dual
benefit of providing a financial rate of return while promoting
economic development.
I. INTRODUCTION
Exclusive reliance on traditional methods of economic develop-
ment in Alaska has hindered the state’s economic growth and has
poorly positioned the state to meet the challenges of twenty-first
century market forces.  While the traditional economic strategies
focus on waiting for the next big oil discovery or for the relocation
of a large company to Alaska, in a newer, more competitive mar-
ketplace, it may be more productive for state and local govern-
ments to focus on ways to increase opportunities for small business
entrepreneurs.  Small businesses add jobs, strengthen the tax base,
and improve overall quality of life for many members of the sur-
rounding community.
Current economic development indicators in Alaska suggest
that many small business entrepreneurs lack access to financing
sources that could help new businesses start or expand existing op-
erations.  In particular, these entrepreneurs need risk capital,1 such
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1. Risk capital includes research and development capital, innovation capital,
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as venture capital, to help their businesses get off the ground, move
to a new stage of development, or facilitate restructuring efforts.
This Note will analyze the need for new economic growth in
Alaska, both in terms of how Alaska is providing for the economic
needs of its citizens internally and how Alaska’s economy com-
pares to the economies of other states.  Next, the Note will con-
sider the current need for equity financing in Alaska and whether
traditional forms of venture capital have sufficiently met this need.
Finally, the Note will propose that a nontraditional venture capital
fund could better fill the equity gap in Alaska and will suggest rec-
ommendations for how to create such a fund that would stimulate
economic development across the state.
II.  THE NEED FOR NEW ECONOMIC GROWTH IN ALASKA
Alaska’s economy has traditionally been built on the state’s
vast natural resources, with the bulk of the state’s income coming
from oil drilling revenues, federal money, or new service sector
jobs created by tourism.2  These industries, particularly the oil in-
dustry, have given Alaska great economic success over the years.
In fact, much of Alaska’s economic history is considered in terms
of pre-Prudhoe Bay and post-Prudhoe Bay.3
A significant portion of the state’s oil revenue has been in-
vested in the Alaska Permanent Fund.4  The Permanent Fund was
created in 1977 after the state began exporting oil from the North
Slope, in order to set aside oil revenues for Alaskans and to pre-
vent politicians from spending all of the money at one time.5  While
seed capital, venture capital, and mezzanine capital.  See discussion infra Part
III.A.
2. LINDA LEASK ET AL., INST. OF SOC. AND ECON. RESEARCH, TRENDS IN
ALASKA’S PEOPLE AND ECONOMY 2 (Oct. 2001), available at http://www.aknf.org
(“Alaska’s economy. . . still depends heavily on state government spending and on
a few resource industries.”).  Service and trade industries created half the new jobs
since 1960, as Alaska’s economy matured and established local support industries
and as tourism increased.  Injection of about $1 billion annually into the economy
from Permanent Fund dividends continued to fuel growth in these industries in
the 1990s.  Id. at 6.
3. The Prudhoe Bay oil field, the largest discovered in North America, was
found on land owned by Alaska in 1968.  By 2001, Alaska had collected over $55
billion in revenues from oil production.  Id. at 2.
4. Id.
5. SCOTT GOLDSMITH, CONFERENCE ON ALBERTA: GOVERNMENT POLICIES
IN A SURPLUS ECONOMY, REFLECTIONS ON THE SURPLUS ECONOMY AND THE
ALASKA PERMANENT FUND 1 (2001). The creation of this fund was a reaction to
the state’s initial management of its oil windfall when over $900 million, which had
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the Permanent Fund has been successful in turning Alaska’s de-
pleting oil resource into a renewable financial resource,6 it cannot
be viewed as the solution for all of the state’s economic problems.
Indeed, there is currently a lack of consensus regarding how the
Permanent Fund should be used to offset current state budget
shortfalls.7
Even with the Permanent Fund as an economic safety net, it is
questionable whether Alaska can continue to rely on its traditional
economy for its economic health.  Current economic indicators
suggest that Alaska’s economy is not well positioned to signifi-
cantly improve in the near future.  While national economy grew
sixty percent in the past fifteen years, the Alaska economy hardly
grew at all.8  In fact, from 1986 to 2002, the Alaska economy grew
by only one percent, and during 2002, it actually contracted by 2.9
percent.9
Much of Alaska’s lackluster growth is based on the decrease in
oil production since the mid-eighties.10  Currently, oil production is
only half of what it was in 1988.11 Also contributing to the slow
growth is the fact that those who work in high-wage industries are
not seeing the same lucrative paychecks as in years past, and the
growth in lower wage trade and service jobs has not taken up the
slack.12  This has “contributed to the slow growth in gross state
product as well as in household income.”13
Further, there is a disconnect between those industries that
pay high wages and those that employ a large number of people.
For example, even though oil brings income to the state, the indus-
try itself does not require a large number of workers to conduct its
operations.14  In contrast, the service and trade industries, including
been paid to the state for the original drilling leases, was squandered by the state
government.  Id.
6. Id. at 3.
7. Id. at 4.
8. SCOTT GOLDSMITH, INST. OF SOC. AND ECON. RESEARCH, HOW ARE WE
DOING?—THE POST-PRUDHOE BLUES (2002), available at http://www.iser.uaa.
alasa.edu/Publications/HowAreWeDoing.doc.
9. Id.
10. Id.; see also SCOTT GOLDSMITH, NINTH CONGRESS OF BASIC INCOME
EUROPEAN NETWORK, THE ALASKA PERMANENT FUND DIVIDEND: AN
EXPERIMENT IN WEALTH DISTRIBUTION 14 (2002) (“Alaska has relied almost ex-
clusively on oil revenues to fund state government for a generation, but they have
been declining for a decade.”).
11. Goldsmith, supra note 8.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. LEASK ET AL., supra note 2, at 6.
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tourism, hire a larger number of workers, but do not pay their
workers as much as those employed in other industries.15  Concerns
about the sustainability of the job base are aggravated by the fact
that “[j]ob growth slowed in the 1990s, as oil production and state
oil revenues dropped and several basic industries—those that bring
new money into the economy—lost jobs.”16  Rural Alaska is par-
ticularly concerned about maintaining job growth if the oil-based
economy continues to decline, because, outside the larger commu-
nities, “[j]obs in the cash economy are scarce, despite the new jobs
added in the 1990s, and the prospects for future growth are lim-
ited.”17  This is especially true for Alaska Natives who comprise the
majority of rural inhabitants and historically have been underrep-
resented in the labor force.18
The apparent “brain drain” of the state’s brightest young citi-
zens adds further concern about Alaska’s economic future.19  In
Alaska, more students leave the state for college than in any other
state, and this trend has only increased; from 1992 to 1998, the
number of students seeking education outside the state increased
from forty-eight to sixty percent.20  This is a concern because stu-
dents who attend school out of state are also far less likely to return
to Alaska after graduation than students who remain in state.21  In
fact, during the 1990s, Alaska’s young adult population22 declined
by twenty-one percent.23  That, in turn, has created higher costs for
15. Id. at 7.
16. Id. at 6.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Ekaterina Bezrodnaya, Brain Drain in Alaska, at http://www.alaskainvest
net.org/interns-article1.html (last visited on Sept. 6, 2003).
20. LEASK ET AL., supra note 2, at 12.
21. Lee Gorusch, UA Reverses Alaska’s Brain Drain,
ANCHORAGE DAILY NEWS, April 18, 2002, at B6, available at
http://www.alaska.edu/state/archives/2002press/UAAprogressGorsuchadn041802.
html.
22. This figure includes individuals between the ages of twenty-five and thirty-
five.
23. Christine Schmid, From Edibles to Equity Local Restaurateur Changed
Careers, Not Priorities, THE JUNEAU EMPIRE (Sept. 13, 2002), at http://www.
juneauempire.com/stories/091302/loc_marshall.shtml; see also Karen McCarthy,
Alaska’s Brain Drain, THE JUNEAU EMPIRE (June 14, 2002), at http://www.juneau
empire.com/stories/061402/let-letter1.shtml (“In 1999, 31 percent [of University of
Alaska students] left Alaska within one year of graduation, and 35 percent left
within five years.”).
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Alaskan companies who must then spend enormous amounts of
money recruiting and relocating people from outside the state.24
Alaska’s size and population density has also significantly af-
fected Alaska’s economic growth.  Alaska is the largest state in the
country, larger than Texas, Montana and California combined.25
Yet, while the average population density in the United States is
seventy-four persons per square mile, Alaska’s population is one
person per square mile, the lowest in the country.26  Within the
state, nearly three-fourths of Alaska’s 627,000 citizens live in or
around the three main cities, with the remainder of the state’s
population scattered throughout the rest of the state.27  Low popu-
lation density can hinder economic growth for several reasons.
First, regions with low population density often lack the basic infra-
structure to support industry development. 28 Second, residents of
these rural areas are more likely to be dependent on a single em-
ployment sector; problems in that sector can have a devastating ef-
fect on the entire community.  Finally, rural jobs tend to be low-
wage or seasonal, which leads to a limited tax base to provide social
services.29 In a state as large as Alaska, there is also the additional
reality that bringing a new business or industry into one part of the
state is unlikely to have an effect on residents of other areas.
Alaska’s economy is weak as compared to the other forty-nine
states.  The 2002 State New Economy Index analyzed the potential
for sustainable economic growth in the “New Economy” by con-
sidering how well each state fares in certain economic categories, in
order to determine how well each state will handle the new realities
of our changing economy.30  The nature of this New Economy is
24. Gorusch, supra note 21.
25. ALASKA DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION AND PUBLIC FACILITIES,
ALASKA TRANSPORTATION FAST FACTS, available at http://www.
dot.state.ak.us/stwdplng/planresc/fast_facts.html (last visited Sept. 6, 2003).
26. Id.
27. LEASK ET AL., supra note 2, at 4.  Note, however, that only thirty-two per-
cent of Alaska Natives live within the six largest census areas.  Id.
28. RURAL ASSISTANCE CENTER: ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, at http://www.
raconline.org/info_guides/communities/econ_dev.php (last visited Sept. 28, 2003).
29. Id.
30. ROBERT D. ATKINSON, PROGRESSIVE POLICY INSTITUTE, 2002 STATE NEW
ECONOMY INDEX (2002), available at http://www.neweconomyindex.org/
states/2002.  The “New Economy” refers to the changes in the national and global
economies that occurred during the end of the 1990s and the beginning of the
2000s.  It is characterized by a “complex array of forces” that include “the reor-
ganization of firms, more efficient and dynamic capital markets, more economic
‘churning’ and entrepreneurial dynamism, continuing economic competition, and
increasingly volatile labor markets.”  Id. at 4.  The realities of the New Economy
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forcing states to develop new strategies for creating new economic
growth.  It is no longer enough for a state to offer huge incentives
to recruit a large company to bring in better jobs or a deeper tax
base; this kind of “buffalo hunting” is not the prescription for eco-
nomic salvation.31  Instead, the states projected to be successful are
those that are focusing on developing entrepreneurial companies,32
as “nearly 70 percent of economic growth is attributable to entre-
preneurial activity.”33  Entrepreneurial firms are a significant
source of jobs in the United States.  According to the Small Busi-
ness Administration, small and medium-sized businesses “account
for about two-thirds of all new jobs in the U.S. economy each
year.”34
The fact that Alaska ranks in the bottom half of the states in
terms of building capacity for entrepreneurial growth in the 2002
New Economy Index is a serious detriment to its potential for
include the following: (1) the importance of new industries and decreasing reli-
ance on traditional industries like manufacturing; (2) a focus on technology in all
aspects of business; (3) an emphasis on innovation rather than access to raw mate-
rials, transportation, etc.; (4) strategies to create locally-based technological inno-
vation and entrepreneurship; and (5) a labor pool of skilled workers.  Id.
31. Id. at 5.  “Buffalo hunting” is the concept of states trying to attract large
new companies to relocate to the state, bring jobs, expand the economy, and
stimulate growth.  Id.
32. Id.
33. THOM RUBEL ET AL., NAT’L GOVERNORS’ ASSOC., NURTURING
ENTREPRENEURIAL GROWTH IN STATE ECONOMIES 6 (2000), available at
www.nga.org/cda/files/ENTREPRENEUR.PDF (citing ANDREW ZACHARAKIS,
ET AL., KAUFFMAN CENTER FOR ENTREPRENEURIAL LEADERSHIP, GLOBAL
ENTREPRENEURSHIP MONITOR: NATIONAL ENTREPRENEURSHIP ASSESSMENT—
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 8 (1999)).
34. JASON R. HENDERSON, Are High-Growth Entrepreneurs Building the Ru-
ral Economy? THE MAIN STREET ECONOMIST (Center for the Study of Rural
America, Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City, Kansas City, Mo.) Aug. 2002, at
2. Note that within the broader definition of “entrepreneur,” distinctions are
sometimes made between “high-growth” and “lifestyle” entrepreneurs.  Id. at 2.
The latter are entrepreneurs who start businesses to support a certain lifestyle or
provide family income; the former are ones who intend to create large, highly visi-
ble companies with significant growth potential. Id. High-growth entrepreneurs
are less common in rural areas because of factors such as the lack of technical or
management experience, limited access to technology, or unavailability of venture
capital.  Id. at 2-3.  For a more detailed discussion of the different types of entre-
preneurs, see also Jason R. Henderson, Building the Rural Economy with High-
Growth Entrepreneurs, ECONOMIC REVIEW (Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas
City, Kansas City, Mo.) Third Quarter 2002, at 48-50, available at
http://www.kc.frb.org.
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overall economic growth.35  While the state scores relatively high in
areas such as manufacturing focusing on exports, online popula-
tion, and technology in schools, Alaska scores in the bottom quin-
tile in educating its manufacturing workforce, online manufactur-
ers, high tech jobs, industry research and development, “gazelle
jobs,”36 and venture capital.37  Overall, Alaska ranks thirty-ninth in
terms of “innovation capacity,” supporting the conclusion that
Alaska is not well-positioned to support entrepreneurial growth
necessary to succeed in the New Economy.38
III.  VENTURE CAPITAL AS AN ECONOMIC
DEVELOPMENT STRATEGY
Venture capital has become an increasingly popular and suc-
cessful development strategy in the last several years for supporting
entrepreneurial development. States that are struggling to
strengthen entrepreneurship and want to position themselves to
meet the economic realities of the new millennium have found that
venture capital, particularly nontraditional venture capital, can
bridge the equity gap that prevents many entrepreneurs from
starting or expanding their businesses.
A. Traditional Venture Capital Models
One of the essential elements to supporting entrepreneurial
growth is ensuring that entrepreneurs have access to a variety of
risk capital sources.39  Forms of risk capital have been traditionally
defined to include the following:
35. ATKINSON, supra note 30, at 7.  Alaska ranks thirty-first out of the fifty
states in the composite score, and its ranking has fallen eighteen places since 1999.
Id.
36. A “gazelle” is often used as a synonym for entrepreneur and is commonly
defined as a “firm with sales or revenue growth that exceeds 20 percent per year
over a four-year period on a revenue base of approximately $100,000.” RUBEL ET
AL., supra note 33, at 9.  Gazelles are often distinguished from traditional small
businesses: while entrepreneurs import cash, are “precompetitive” in terms of
business maturity, and need more technical assistance, traditional small businesses
recycle existing dollars and are typically well-established and do not need or want
any public assistance.  Id.
37. ATKINSON, supra note 30, at 10-11.
38. Id. at 33 (“The innovation capacity indicators . . . measure five things: 1)
share of jobs in high-tech industries; 2) scientists and engineers as a share of the
workforce; 3) the number of patents relative to the size of the workforce; 4) indus-
try R&D as a share of G[ross] S[tate] P[roduct] [(GSP)]; and 5) venture capital
invested as a share of GSP.”).
39. RUBEL ET AL., supra note 33, at 9.
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(1)Research and development capital – funds invested in
support of basic research and development; (2) Innova-
tion capital – funds invested for applied research to de-
velop new products; (3) Seed capital – funds invested to
support new and young companies without fully estab-
lished commercial operations, launch new products, or
continue research and product development; (4) Venture
capital – long-term equity capital invested in rapidly ex-
panding enterprises with an expectation of significant
capital gains, often for product roll-out; and (5) Mezza-
nine capital – capital invested with a structure involving
subordinated debt, generally in profitable, established
companies.40
Risk capital is also described in terms of equity capital as opposed
to debt finance.  Debt finance is characterized by the borrower’s
specific obligation to repay the loan on a predetermined schedule.
In these situations, the lender will be able to recover the outstand-
ing debt if the borrower fails to repay, even if the borrower is
forced into bankruptcy.41  In an equity capital transaction, the indi-
vidual or institution who provides the funds gains a share of owner-
ship in the business; the equity investor does not have a right to a
predetermined repayment schedule or a preferential claim on the
assets but is entitled to a share of future profits or losses.42  Gener-
ally speaking, the term “venture capital” is often used to encom-
pass equity deals, when money is invested rather than loaned.43
Venture capital provides an entrepreneur with funds needed
to get a business off the ground, develop a new product, or grow
the business in a new direction.44  Both successful and struggling
companies may need venture capital.  Businesses that are doing
well may require money for production, marketing, or expansion;
those that are struggling can use venture capital to get back on
40. Id. (emphasis added).
41. DAVID FRESHWATER ET AL., RURAL POLICY RESEARCH INST.,
NONTRADITIONAL VENTURE CAPITAL INSTITUTIONS: FILLING A MARKET GAP 6
fig.1 (2001), available at http://www.rupri.org/pubs/archive/reports/P2001-11/gap.
html.
42. Id.
43. Equity for Rural America: Community Development Venture Capital,
COMMUNITY REINVESTMENT (Fed. Reserve Bank of Kansas City, Kansas City,
Mo.), Fall 1999, at 1 [hereinafter Equity for Rural America].
44. For a comprehensive explanation of how venture capital arrangements can
be made by entrepreneurs, see generally JOSEPH W. BARTLETT, FUNDAMENTALS
OF VENTURE CAPITAL (1999).
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track.45  In both cases, venture capital may also help companies lev-
erage additional sources of financing such as bank loans, which re-
quire a prudent ratio of equity to debt.46
From the investor’s perspective, venture capital is a way to in-
vest in a business for a fixed period of time and then to redeem or
sell the investment with a significant return, usually in the goal
range of twenty to fifty percent.47  Because maximizing rate of re-
turn is their primary objective,  venture capitalists generally invest
in a company for three to seven years until they can liquidate their
interests through an initial public offering or through a merger or
sale of the company.48  Such liquidation is possible because the
funding agreements between investors and investees typically re-
quire businesses to relinquish some level of company ownership in
return for a capital investment.49  The investment may take the
form of stock or a type of financing instrument that can be con-
verted into stock at a future date.50  Venture capitalists typically
choose to receive preferred stock since it provides preferential
treatment upon liquidation or sale of the company.51
Traditional venture capital firms are organized as partnerships
or as limited liability companies, though they may also be corpora-
tions.52  The investments used to start, or capitalize, a venture capi-
tal fund can come from a variety of sources such as pension or en-
dowment funds, foundations, corporations, individual investors, or
even the venture capitalists themselves.53  The types of investors
and amount invested depend on the general partner of the fund,
the kinds of companies targeted for investment, and the projected
fund size.54  The industry sees investments from $50,000 to $20 mil-
45. Id.
46. Kerwin Tesdel, Venture Capital for Communities, COMMUNITY
INVESTMENTS (Fed. Reserve Bank of San Francisco, San Francisco, Cal.) March
2002, at 24.
47. DAVID L. BARKLEY ET AL., RURAL POLICY RESEARCH INST., EQUITY
CAPITAL FOR NONMETROPOLITAN BUSINESSES: AN INTRODUCTION TO
ALTERNATIVE SOURCES AND DIRECTORY TO RELATED WEB SITES 8 (1999),
available at http://www.rupri.org/publications/archive/pbriefs/PB99-3/pb99-3.pdf.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id. Examples of the latter include convertible debentures or debts with
warrants.  Id.
51. Id.
52. BARTLETT, supra note 44, at 6.
53. BARKLEY ET AL., supra note 47, at 8.
54. Id. at 9-10.
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lion; the most common deals fall within the range of $500,000 to
$25 million.55
Traditional venture capital firms are concentrated in certain
parts of the country and tend to focus on particular industries.  For
example, in 1999, more than sixty-seven percent of all venture capi-
tal investments were made in only four states: California, Massa-
chusetts, New York, and Texas. 56  Furthermore, ninety percent of
the investments were made in technology-based companies.57
These statistics indicate that the majority of venture capital invest-
ments are being made both in areas and in industries where in-
vestments have been made before.  Very few deals are being done
in rural America or in areas off the beaten, high-tech track.58
Places like Alaska are often left with limited access to the funda-
mental source of improving entrepreneurship opportunities.
Some would argue that the reason for the lack of venture capi-
tal in the non-metropolitan marketplace is purely a matter of eco-
nomics; companies in non-metropolitan markets “simply do not of-
fer competitive rates of return,” and therefore do not get funded.59
In other words, these individuals suggest that the reason many
small businesses fail to attract funding is because of their failure to
offer the same risk-adjusted rate of return that can be earned on
other investments.60  This view fails to recognize some of the spe-
cific hurdles to rural equity, which include both the nature of the
rural capital market itself and the difficulties in applying the tradi-
tional model of venture capital financing to the unique characteris-
tics of the rural marketplace.
The nature of the rural capital market system itself often bars
rural businesses from access to sources of debt and equity financ-
55. Id. at 8.
56. Deborah M. Markley, Financing the New Rural Economy, PROCEEDINGS,
(Fed. Reserve Bank of Kansas City, Kansas City, Mo.) Sept. 2001, at 72, available
at http://www.kc.frb.org/Publicat/Exploring/RC01Mark.pdf-10-15-01.  In fact, forty
percent were made in Silicon Valley alone.  FRESHWATER ET AL., supra note 41, at
3.
57. FRESHWATER ET AL., supra note 41, at 3.
58. For the purposes of this analysis, this Note will assume that the state of
Alaska as a whole would meet the general definition of “rural” or non-
metropolitan.
59. Matt P. McClorey, Are State-Sponsored Venture Capital Funds Necessary
for the Development and Growth of the Kansas Economy?, 7 KAN. J.L. & PUB.
POL’Y 152, 160 (1998) (using the state of Kansas as a model for demonstrating that
there is no “shortage” of venture capital and stating that an offer of comeptitive
return rates by companies would result in an increase in capital provided by
investors).
60. FRESHWATER ET AL., supra note 41, at 7.
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ing.  In terms of debt financing, the consolidation or merger of lo-
cal banks into larger national “money center” institutions in the
past decade has led to a decrease in the number of business loans
being made in rural communities.61  Consolidation has also led to a
decreased emphasis on relationship-based lending and an increased
focus on transaction-based lending.62  Relationship-based lending
relies on information the banker has gained through contacts with
the borrower made during the deposit relationship, allowing a
banker to supplement limited financial information and still make a
deal.63  Relationship-based lending can often be more helpful for a
business owner who is trying to start a business in a sector unfa-
miliar to the banker or for a business owner who does not have
much of a track record.64  Because relationship-based lending relies
on information the banker has gained through contacts with the
borrower, a banker may be able to loan more to business entrepre-
neurs who are unable to supply all of the financial information
normally required of unknown parties.65  Transaction-based lend-
ing, however, relies on quantitative data rather than qualitative
data—credit scoring and financial statements instead of personal
experience.66  Thus, the increase in transaction-based lending and
the decrease in relationship-based lending in rural communities
may bar entrepreneurs in rural communities from obtaining debt
finance.67
On the equity side, some economists believe that the lack of
well-developed rural venture capital markets may be caused by
“market failures that result from imperfect information and high
transaction costs.”68  High transaction costs, in turn, limit the deal
flow69 of venture capital deals in rural communities.  Rural commu-
nities are often characterized by low-tech, slow-growth sectors: sec-
tors that do not generate the number of deals or high rates of re-
61. See Markley, supra note 56, at 70-71.
62. Id. at 71.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 72.
68. Id.
69. “Deal flow” is the number of potential investment opportunities available
at a given time.  David L. Barkley et al., Establishing Nontraditional Venture
Capital Institutions: The Decision Making Process 6, Rural Policy Research
Institute (2001), available at http://www.rupri.org/publications/archive/reports/
P2001-11/decision.html.
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turn that typically attract traditional venture capital investors.70
The limited number of deals leads to higher costs per investment
for both identifying prospective deals and maintaining the neces-
sary relationship with particular companies.71  This is because ven-
ture capital firms are often characterized by a high level of in-
volvement in the businesses in which they invest.72  Thus, in
addition to economic considerations, the hand-holding nature of
the venture capital business is compromised if the venture capital
firm is geographically removed from the business in which it is in-
vesting.73
Several other factors account for the lack of traditional ven-
ture capital investing in rural areas.  The limited number of oppor-
tunities for existing deals may make rural venture capital investing
appear less attractive to traditional funds.74  In addition, rural busi-
ness owners may be reluctant to give up ownership or control in
exchange for venture capital equity,75 instead preferring to keep the
business in the family by transferring ownership to the next genera-
tion.76  This means that traditional venture capital exit strategies
like initial public offerings may not be possible.  Finally, rural areas
may not have the business service infrastructure—including well-
trained attorneys, accountants, bankers, and business consultants—
required to support venture capital investing.77
70. Id. at 73-74; see also Equity for Rural America, supra note 43, at 2.
71. Markley, supra note 56, at 74; see also David L. Barkley et al., Nontradi-
tional Sources of Venture Capital for Rural America, 16 RURAL AMERICA 1, 19
(May 2001), available at http://www.ers.usda.gov/publications/ruralamerica/ra161/
ra161d.pdf (“‘Small market’ areas such as non-metro communities and rural areas
are especially overlooked by traditional venture capital firms because of the rela-
tively high cost of finding or creating deals and managing the investments.”).
72. Fund managers may be intimately involved in the financing of the deal,
may serve on the board of directors, and may give management or financial advice
to the business.  The fund may even take over the management of the business if it
seems necessary to save the company or protect the fund’s investment.  Equity for
Rural America, supra note 43, at 1.
73. William Amt, Looking for Venture Capital in Rural America, 12
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT DIGEST NUMBER 7, JUNE 2001 (NADO Research
Foundation, Washington, D.C.), available at http://www.nado.org/pubs/june6.
html.
74. Markley, supra note 56, at 74.
75. Barkley et. al., supra note 71, at 20; Equity for Rural America, supra note
43, at 2.
76. Barkley, supra note 71, at 20; Markley, supra note 56, at 74.
77. FRESHWATER ET AL., supra note 41, at 4.
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B. Nontraditional Venture Capital May Provide a Better Solution
for Rural Communities
As discussed above, venture capital opportunities are fewer
and smaller in rural areas.  More time may be required before
available opportunities to create a viable return on investments be-
come available, and alternative methods of management or exit
strategies may be required.  For these reasons, traditional venture
capitalists often do not find it worthwhile to conduct business in ru-
ral areas when there are “better” deals to be made elsewhere.
However, these flaws in the rural capital market system and barri-
ers to rural financing do not mean that venture capital financing is
impossible.  In fact, success of nontraditional venture capital funds
in rural areas indicates that equity deals can be done successfully in
rural areas under the right set of circumstances.78
Nontraditional venture capital funds bridge the equity gap that
exists in communities unserved or underserved by traditional ven-
ture capital firms.  As the name itself suggests, nontraditional funds
typically operate outside the scope of traditional funds either in
terms of geography or business sector.  Nontraditional funds may
be located in small market areas such as nonmetropolitan areas or
rural communities and typically have specific geographic restric-
tions on potential investments.79  The restrictions may be so narrow
that the fund only invests in a particular community or may be
broad enough that the fund can do business across an entire re-
gion.80  Furthermore, nontraditional funds tend to focus on indus-
tries outside of, or in addition to, the high-tech sector.81
Perhaps the biggest difference between traditional and non-
traditional venture capital funds is the difference in financial goals.
While traditional venture capital funds expect an annual return on
investment in excess of thirty to forty percent, nontraditional funds
expect more modest returns,82 in part because they have social or
economic purposes in mind in addition to maximizing the financial
78. See generally DAVID L. BARKLEY ET AL., RURAL POLICY RESEARCH INST.,
ESTABLISHING NONTRADITIONAL VENTURE CAPITAL INSTITUTIONS: LESSONS
LEARNED (2001), available at http://www.rupri.org/publications/archive/reports/
P2001-11/lessons.html.
79. Id. at 3.
80. Id. at 3-4.  For example, one fund focuses only on Appalachia; another will
make investments anywhere east of the Mississippi River.  Id.
81. Id.
82. Id.  Most nontraditional funds are willing to take less than traditional
funds.  For example, they may take less than 30 percent because they have addi-
tional social goals beyond pure financing.  Id. at 12.
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rate of return.83  The alternative goals may include creating jobs for
low or moderate income individuals, building companies that are
owned by women or minorities, or ensuring that local workers
achieve particular wage or benefit levels.84  The combination of fi-
nancial and economic development goals is commonly referred to
as a double or dual bottom line.85
Because of the lowered rate of return and the emphasis on the
double bottom line, nontraditional venture capital funds tend to at-
tract different types of investors than traditional funds.86  In par-
ticular, nontraditional funds are typically capitalized by funding
sources that value social and economic returns, or are willing to be
a more patient source of investment capital.87  Potential sources of
funds might include public state funds, foundation support, or
banks that are seeking Community Reinvestment Act credit.88
Nontraditional funds may also be able to leverage additional funds
through federal sources.  For example, the Small Business Admini-
stration (“SBA”) regulates both the Small Business Investment
Company (“SBIC”) Program and the New Markets Venture Capi-
tal (“NMVC”) Program, and the Treasury Department manages
the Community Development Financial Institution (“CDFI”)
Fund.89
The type of investors willing or able to capitalize a nontradi-
tional fund frequently determines what kind of fund structure will
work in a particular area.90  Some of the common types of nontradi-
tional venture capital institutions are: (1) publicly funded, publicly
managed venture capital funds; (2) publicly funded, privately man-
83. Markley, supra note 56, at 75.
84. JULIA SASS RUBIN, COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT VENTURE CAPITAL
ALLIANCE, COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT VENTURE CAPITAL: A REPORT ON THE
INDUSTRY 17 (2001).  These types of investment criteria are also referred to as so-
cial screens.  Id.
85. Community Development Venture Capital: The Double Bottom Line,
COMMUNITY INVESTMENTS (Fed. Reserve Bank of San Francisco, San Francisco,
Cal.), Fall 1998, at 1, available at http://www.frbsf.org/publications/community/
investments/cra98-4/page3.html (Fall 1998) [hereinafter The Double Bottom Line].
86. Id. at 4.
87. DEBORAH MARKLEY ET AL., RURAL POLICY RESEARCH INSTITUTE,
RURAL EQUITY MARKET INNOVATION: A NATIONAL SNAPSHOT 6-7, (1999), avail-
able at http://www.rupri.org/publications/archive/old/finance/p99-1/p99-1.pdf; see
also Markley, supra note 56, at 75.  Being a patient source of capital means that
the investor is willing to wait longer to receive its return on investment than the
typical venture capital investor who expects a return in three to seven years.
88. Markley, supra note 56, at 77-78.
89. Id. at 77.
90. MARKLEY ET AL, supra note 87, at 9.
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aged venture capital funds; (3) certified capital companies (“CAP-
COs”); (4) small business investment companies (“SBICs”); and
(5) community development venture funds (“CDVCs”).91  Each of
these institutions has its own strengths and weaknesses.  States
looking to develop one or more of these programs should look
closely at how the comparative advantages and disadvantages
might apply in the context of the state’s unique qualities and
goals.92
1. Publicly Funded, Publicly Managed.  These programs are
usually set up with the goal of promoting economic development or
improving access to venture capital.93  They are most often man-
aged by employees of state agencies, such as the Department of
Commerce, or quasi-public organizations.94  The boards of direc-
tors, who are responsible for making investment decisions and pro-
viding oversight, are typically appointed by the governor.95  These
types of funds are most often capitalized by public funds generated
from state appropriations or bond sales.  Because of the substantial
reliance on state funding, these funds come with restrictions that all
or part of the investments be made within the state and that the in-
vestments comply with the state’s goal for economic development.96
Advantages of publicly funded, publicly managed funds in-
clude the state’s ability to direct its funding toward particular pol-
icy objectives or industries.97  This may ensure that economic and
social impacts are more likely to be considered in investment deci-
sions.98  On the other hand, however, these funds often face sub-
stantial political pressure to make investments in specific areas or
specific businesses that might not otherwise be considered good in-
vestments.99  In addition, publicly managed firms may not be able
to attract the most qualified or competent fund managers, and pri-
vate venture capital firms may not be willing to co-invest with these
types of funds because of the perception of the funds as over-
politicized and less responsive to private sector investors.100  This
91. BARKLEY ET AL., supra note 71, at 22-23; BARKLEY ET AL., supra note 78,
at 4-5.
92. BARKLEY ET AL., supra note 78, at 6.
93. Id. at 5.
94. Id.; BARKLEY ET AL., supra note 71, at 21.
95. BARKLEY ET AL., supra note 71, at 21.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 24.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id.
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may limit the fund’s ability to invest in a broader range of opportu-
nities.101  A final barrier to receiving state investment is the fact that
some state constitutions do not allow state agencies to make equity
investments.102
2. Publicly Funded, Privately Managed.  Like publicly
funded, publicly managed funds, publicly funded but privately
managed funds typically receive the bulk of their capitalization
from public sources.  Unlike their publicly managed counterparts,
however, privately managed funds are typically organized with a
slightly different purpose.  The purpose of these funds is often to
increase the supply of professionally managed venture capital in a
region, or to enhance the infrastructure and management capacity
of venture capital already existing in the region.103  Thus, these
funds tend to focus more on maximizing profits and less on social
or economic development objectives.104  While the state may sacri-
fice some control for private management, it gains more limited fi-
nancial risk and may receive better economic returns.105
Capitalization of this type of fund has varied among different
programs.  Some have obtained state funding with a requirement
for a private match or provided additional inducements to encour-
age private investment.106  For example, one fund was able to guar-
antee private investors that they would receive a minimum return
on investment before the state received its return.  In another in-
stance, the State did not require any return on its investment,
thereby providing private investors with significant leverage or
premium on their investments.107
While publicly funded, privately managed funds have many
advantages that their publicly managed counterparts lack — such
as less political pressure, greater opportunity to attract and assist
experienced managers, and greater leverage for private capital —
101. Id.  However, sometimes using state funding is the best way of getting a
fund off the ground.  A fund may later be able to move away from its reliance on
the state if it feels that the goals of the institution have changed.  For example, a
Kansas fund is currently in the process of buying out the state’s interest in the
fund so it can focus on investment deals with a higher potential for return on in-
vestment.  DEBORAH M. MARKLEY ET AL., RURAL POLICY RESEARCH INSTITUTE,
CASE STUDIES 32-37 (2001).
102. BARKLEY ET AL, supra note 70, at 24.  Alaska’s constitution does not ex-
plicitly mention equity investments.
103. Id. at 22.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id.
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they are not without disadvantages.108  Because of the increased fo-
cus on rate of return, these funds may not address a state’s eco-
nomic development concerns and may lack sufficient public subsi-
dies to make venture capital institutions viable in rural
communities.109  Even so, the combination of public funding and
private management is considered to be one of the most effective
in bringing venture capital financing to rural communities, par-
ticularly in areas that require a significant amount of early stage in-
vesting.110
Regardless of whether publicly funded venture capital funds
are privately or publicly managed, there are several public funding
issues that individuals trying to create new funds should consider.111
Public funding should be given in one lump sum rather than as an
annual appropriation over a period of time.112  While it may be
more difficult to convince a state to make a large lump sum in-
vestment, the “vagaries of the political process” often make annual
appropriations more trouble than they are worth.113  Funds receiv-
ing annual appropriations may make suboptimal investment deci-
sions because they feel pressure to use the appropriation whether
or not there are good deals available.114  Furthermore, because in-
vestment failures are more likely to occur before successes, the po-
litical will to continue disbursing appropriations can be compro-
mised, thereby jeopardizing the success of both present and future
deals.115  And finally, as mentioned previously, an additional prob-
lem with accepting public funds may be the state’s restrictions on
geographic or economic development objectives.116  These restric-
tions may limit the fund’s ability to generate enough deal flow to
keep the fund going and may make it impossible for the fund to
partner with other investors outside the state.117
3. Certified Capital Companies (“CAPCOs”).  Another
model for state-assisted venture capital development is the use of
CAPCOs.  CAPCOs are privately funded, privately managed ven-
ture capital institutions, created by state enabling legislation, and
108. Id. at 24.
109. Id.; BARKLEY ET AL, supra note 69, 12.
110. MARKLEY ET AL, supra note 87, at 16.
111. BARKLEY ET AL., supra note 109, at 12.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Id.
111703 HOOPENGARDNER.DOC 12/29/03  2:02 PM
374 ALASKA LAW REVIEW [20:2
capitalized by insurance companies, which pursue maximized in-
ternal rates of return while meeting a state’s regulatory require-
ments.118  The legislation typically provides that insurance compa-
nies will receive 100 percent state tax credits over ten years on
premium taxes in exchange for their investment.119  The insurance
companies that provide the capitalization are also guaranteed a re-
turn on their investment.120  To maintain certification and qualifica-
tion for tax credits, CAPCOs are generally required to invest a cer-
tain percent of funds in businesses within the state or in certain
sectors.121
CAPCOs often appear attractive to states trying to support
venture capital development because the states do not have to take
money out of their general budgets and do not have to raise funds
through bond sales.122  CAPCOs also have the advantage of being
able to raise substantially more capital in a much faster time frame
than funds capitalized by other sources of public funds, and—like
privately managed public funds—they make it easier to attract pri-
vate co-investors and offer more competitive compensation for
managers.123  Further, unlike most venture capital institutions
where capitalized investments are fully at risk, CAPCO investors
assume little or no risk.124
While CAPCOs appear very attractive on the surface, they
have been widely criticized in recent years for being a boon to in-
surance companies while providing lesser benefits to states or small
businesses.125  First, CAPCOs are considered the most expensive
model of venture capital, particularly when compared to how much
118. BARKLEY ET AL., supra note 78, at 6.
119. Id.; see also ROBERT G. HEARD ET AL., NATIONAL GOVERNORS’
ASSOCIATION, GROWING NEW BUSINESSES WITH SEED AND VENTURE CAPITAL:
STATE EXPERIENCES AND OPTIONS 14 (2000), available at
http://www.nga.org/cda/files/VENCAPITAL.PDF.
120. CHIP COOPER ET AL., UNDERSTANDING CAPCOS 4, NATIONAL
ASSOCIATION OF SEED AND VENTURE FUNDS (Oct. 2001), available at http://
www.nasvf.org.
121. Id.
122. David L. Barkley et al., Certified Capital Companies (CAPCOs): Strengths
and Shortcomings of the Latest Wave in State-Assisted Venture Capital Programs,
ECON. DEV. QUARTERLY 350, 360, Nov. 2001.
123. Id. at 360-61.
124. COOPER ET AL., supra note 120, at 6.  Lack of risk taking means that
CAPCO managers have little incentive to make prudent investment decisions
since none of their assets are at risk and the institution’s assets have a guaranteed
rate of return.  See Barkley et. al., supra note 122, at 362.
125. See Barkley et. al., supra note 120, at 362; COOPER ET AL., supra note 120,
at 10.
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states typically spend on other economic development strategies.126
Second, state legislators often receive very biased information
about the relative strengths and weaknesses of CAPCOs because
the insurance/CAPCO industry itself is often the one lobbying for
new programs or additional resources; this may lead to legislation
that is ill-suited for a state’s true economic development needs.127
Finally, CAPCOs tend to do very little seed or start-up investing.128
4. Small Business Investment Companies (“SBICs”).  SBICs
are privately owned for-profit investment institutions licensed and
regulated by the SBA.129  SBICs leverage private capital with bor-
rowed federal funds to make equity investments.130  An SBIC may
be organized as a corporation, limited partnership, or limited li-
ability company,131 and is typically owned by a small group of local
investors or by a commercial bank.132  SBICs are required to have a
minimum private capital reserve of $2.5 million to be licensed and
$5 million to leverage SBA funds ($10 million if the SBIC intends
to issue securities guaranteed by the SBA).133  SBA regulations also
require that SBICs invest only in “small” companies and must
maintain minimum standards for qualified fund managers.134
Advantages of SBICs include the ability to leverage private
capital with federal funding, which can be very attractive to poten-
126. Barkley et al., supra note 122, at 361.  For example, the five states that
have implemented CAPCO programs have committed $1.25 billion in tax credits,
which is considered an enormous allocation of public funds when compared to
other commitments to high tech, rural, or minority business development.
COOPER ET AL., supra note 120, at 5.
127. See Barkley et al., supra note 122, at 362.
128. Id.
129. See 15 U.S.C. § 661 et seq (2003).
130. BARKLEY ET AL., supra note 78 at 6, 9; see 15 U.S.C. § 661.
131. 15 U.S.C. § 681(a).
132. Overview: The SBIC Program, at http://www.sba.gov/INV/
overview.html (last visited Oct. 27, 2003).
133. 15 U.S.C. § 682(a).
134. “Small” companies are ones with a net worth less than or equal to $18
million and an average net income not exceeding $6 million, though industries
with large average firm sizes have higher standards.  BARKLEY ET AL., supra note
47, at 2. The SBA also considers the experience of the company’s managers and
owners.  15 U.S.C. § 683(a)(3)(B).  Management experience, or “track record,” is
a key consideration for SBA approval.  Joseph W. Bartlett, Government-
Enhanced Equity Available for Investment in Traditional Venture Capital and
Buyouts: The New SBIC Participating Securities Program, 1994 COLUM. BUS. L.
REV. 589, 610 (1994).
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tial private investors.135  There is also a lot of flexibility in the SBIC
program to invest in different industries or in business in various
stages of development, depending on the investment policy or fi-
nancing preference of individual SBIC management teams.136
SBICs are also thought to have potential for exceptional returns
from venture capital investments in small businesses and are attrac-
tive because of their flexible investment structures and ability to
obtain long-term funds at favorable rates from the federal govern-
ment.137  Bank investors find SBICs particularly attractive because
they allow for equity investments free of many of the restrictions
imposed by current banking law.138  A significant disadvantage,
however, may be the difficulty in finding enough private investors
to meet the SBA’s minimum capitalization requirements in the first
place.139  This is considered the primary reason why SBICs are so
uncommon in nonmetropolitan or rural areas.140  In addition, the
immediate debt repayment required by SBIC government loans
may make SBICs shy away from doing riskier seed or early-stage
investing because of high delinquency rates.141
5. Community Development Venture Capital (“CDVC”)
Funds.  A growing sector of the nontraditional venture capital
market is in the area of  CDVC funds.142  These funds are charac-
terized by their attempt to maximize return on investment within
the parameters of core community development goals.143  Most
CDVCs are mission-oriented and believe that one of the primary
mechanisms for alleviating poverty in distressed communities is to
help create access to high-quality jobs.144
Apart from their commitment to the same broad goal, CDVCs
vary significantly from fund to fund or state to state, particularly in
135. BARKLEY ET AL., supra note 47, at 3.
136. Id.
137. Small Business Investment Companies, at http://www.evw.com/
practiceareas/businessfinance/manuals/sbicintr.htm.
138. Id.
139. BARKLEY ET AL., supra note 78, at 9.
140. Id. at 6.  A Rural Policy Research Institute study of nontraditional venture
capital institutions found that only one SBIC is located in a rural area and few
others have a significantly rural focus.  Id.
141. BARKLEY ET AL., supra note 47, at 3.
142. The Double Bottom Line, supra note 84, at 4.
143. BARKLEY ET AL., supra note 47, at 7.
144. Julia Sass Rubin, Organizations on the Institutional Cusp: The Origins and
Behaviors of Community Development Venture Capital Funds 70-71 (2001) (un-
published Ph.D. dissertation, Harvard University) (on file with author).
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terms of size and investment objective.145  Generally speaking, a
significant portion of CDVC capital has come from banks or other
financial institutions; a recent study of the industry found that
when all CDVC funds are taken into account, fifty-eight percent of
the capital for funds created within the past four years had come
from these sources.146  Other sources of capital include foundation
support in the form of program-related investment as well as state
and federal funding.147
The CDVC model has several strengths that make this type of
fund particularly appropriate for targeted economic develop-
ment.148  As the name itself suggests, CDVCs intentionally seek out
community economic development objectives.  These funds may
focus on social goals such as job creation or may target particular
geographic areas, business stages, or types of industries that are of-
ten overlooked by traditional venture capitalists.149  CDVCs are
also more likely than other venture capital funds to consider exit
strategies that benefit the business owners or workers instead of
focusing entirely on maximizing return on investment.  For exam-
ple, some CDVCs have tried to use employee stock ownership
plans or management buybacks, strategies that take longer periods
of time and are not as lucrative but provide more benefits to the
community.150  Finally, because CDVCs are often heavily subsi-
dized, they are able to provide extensive technical assistance to
their portfolio companies, a factor that significantly improves suc-
cess rates.151
Creating a fund that has a double bottom line is often a tricky
task.  The CDVC model may experience difficulty raising capital
and reaching scale, difficulty attracting experienced talent, and po-
tentially prohibitive cost of operation.152  For example, CDVC
funds often have a hard time attracting experienced managers to
operate the fund both because of the experience required for a
fund manager and the salary such a manager would likely de-
145. See generally RUBIN, supra note 84.
146. Id. at 11.  One reason for the increase in financial institution investing is
attractiveness of using CDVC investments as a way of meeting Community Rein-
vestment Act obligations.  Id.
147. Id.
148. BARKLEY ET AL., supra note 78, at 8-9.
149. Id.
150. RUBIN, supra note 84, at 15.
151. Id. at 17-18.
152. The Double Bottom Line, supra note 84.
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mand.153  There are several reasons why CDVCs are so expensive to
operate.  First, the average size of the investment is usually small,
but the cost of a smaller investment is often the same as the cost of
a larger investment.  Second, CDVC funds are often even more in-
volved in the management of their investee businesses and provide
more technical assistance than traditional funds.  Therefore, many
CDVC funds require some sort of subsidy to ensure that the dou-
ble bottom line objectives can be met without unduly reducing the
investment earnings.154  Finally, CDVCs may also find it difficult to
maintain sufficient investment diversification because of limited
deal flow. 155
IV.  IMPLEMENTING A NONTRADITIONAL VENTURE
CAPITAL MODEL IN ALASKA
As the economic growth statistics suggest, Alaska needs to re-
focus its economic development effort to help its citizens deal with
the realities of the New Economy.  To this end, Alaska should con-
sider supporting the development of a nontraditional venture capi-
tal fund that focuses on increasing entrepreneurship.  After a com-
prehensive study of nontraditional venture capital funds, the Rural
Policy Research Institute (“RUPRI”) has identified seven steps
that new fund organizers should consider when creating a nontradi-
tional venture capital fund: (1) recognize the reason for creating
the institution; (2) conduct market analysis to estimate deal flow or
potential for creating deal flow; (3) articulate goals and objectives
for the fund; (4) select an appropriate size and management struc-
ture; (5) identify sources of funds to capitalize the institution; (6)
select the legal and organizational structure; and (7) manage in-
vestment activity.156
Using RUPRI’s outline as a general guide, the following part
of this Note will analyze the reasons why Alaska should participate
in the creation of a nontraditional venture capital fund as an eco-
nomic development strategy and will consider the steps that must
be taken to get a new fund off the ground.  In particular, this Part
will consider the need for venture capital in Alaska, what goals or
objectives such a fund should have, how the fund could be capital-
153. Id. at 11.  A traditional venture capital fund manager typically receives an
annual management fee based on two to three percent of the fund capital in addi-
tion to a predetermined percentage of the profit or earned interest on the fund’s
investments.  This structure encourages traditional fund managers to maximize the
rate of return.  BARKLEY ET AL., supra note 78, at 3.
154. The Double Bottom Line, supra note 84, at 10.
155. Id. at 5.
156. BARKLEY ET AL., supra note 109, at 3.
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ized, and how it should be managed.  This Part will conclude that
Alaska is well-positioned to create a nontraditional venture capital
fund that takes a blended approach to achieving both a return on
investment and an impact on economic development.
A. There is a Need for Nontraditional Venture Capital in Alaska.
Broad statistical indicators suggest that Alaska needs to im-
prove its capital infrastructure to support small business and entre-
preneurial development,157 and individuals in Alaska working to
stimulate business development acknowledge that the need is
great.  Several directors of nonprofit organizations in Alaska that
focus on building entrepreneurship have found that Alaskan entre-
preneurs face limited opportunities for obtaining equity financing
to start or grow their businesses.158  A more comprehensive venture
capital market in the state could fill this gap and give entrepreneurs
the support they need to grow their businesses while providing the
state with a more stable and prosperous economic base.159
While no formal market study has been conducted in Alaska,
Jamie Kenworthy, the former Executive Director of the Alaska
Science and Technology Foundation (“ASTF”) conducted an in-
formal market study to determine what particular financing gaps
exist in Alaska.160  He interviewed ten individuals who represent a
157. See discussion infra Part I.
158. Telephone interview with Deborah Marshall, Executive Director, Alaska
InvestNET (Nov. 18, 2002); telephone interview with Jamie Kenworthy, former
Executive Director, Alaska Science and Technology Foundation (Dec. 16, 2002)
[hereinafter Kenworthy interview]. Alaska InvestNet is a statewide non-profit
corporation that provides technical assistance to help entrepreneurs gain access to
business development resources and potential investors.  See generally Alaska In-
vestNET, at http://www.alaskainvestnet.org (last visited Oct. 21, 2003).  Alaska
Science and Technology Foundation (ASTF) was a state agency that was created
in 1988, pursuant to Alaska Statutes section 37.17.010, to improve the state’s sci-
ence and engineering capabilities.  Due to budget shortfalls, the agency was de-
funded in the spring of 2003. Richard Richtmyer, End Nears for State Science
Agency; Alaska Science and Technology Foundation Will Cease to Exist after June
30, ANCHORAGE DAILY NEWS, May 30, 2003, at D1.
159. Kenworthy interview, supra note 156; see also Deborah Marshall, New
Ideas Can Help Alaska’s Future: Creating an Entrepreneurial Culture in Alaska,
available at http://www.alaskainvestnet.org/interns-article3.html (last visited Oct.
24, 2003) (discussing the lack of an entrepreneurial culture in Alaska and
strategies for improving access to capital and business development assistance).
160. Letter from Jamie Kenworthy, former Executive Director, Alaska Science
and Technology Foundation, to Board of Directors, Alaska Science and Technol-
ogy Foundation (Aug. 2000) (on file with author) [hereinafter 2000 Letter]; Ken-
worthy interview, supra note 156.
111703 HOOPENGARDNER.DOC 12/29/03  2:02 PM
380 ALASKA LAW REVIEW [20:2
variety of organizations that have done or tried to do venture capi-
tal-type equity deals in the past.  Some of the questions included:
(1) Are there deals that could be financed in Alaska but have not
been? (2) If not, why not?  Was it because of the deal size, the
business sector, or level of risk? (3) What are some examples of
deals that have not been financed but should have been? (4) What
level of capital is needed for deals that are being left un-done? And
(5) If a new venture fund were started, what characteristics should
it have in terms of investment type, management structure, organi-
zation structure, use of public funds, etc.?161  Based on the results of
this study, Kenworthy argues that Alaska has a sufficient deal flow
to justify creating a new venture capital institution in the state.162
In particular, the Alaska market study indicates that the ma-
jority of potential deal flow would come from manufacturing (e.g.,
seafood, forest products, etc.), resource development, and tele-
communications sectors.163  Other potential deals might include
technology or tourism-based businesses.164  In addition, the market
analysis demonstrates a need for both equity and blended
debt/equity deals.  Many of the individuals surveyed also noted a
need for a fund that has the capacity to make larger deals in the $1
million plus range or a willingness to provide mezzanine capital.165
While Kenworthy’s survey provides a good overview of the
current market in Alaska, it may not be sufficiently persuasive to
encourage potential investors to put up capital.  Furthermore,
largely anecdotal evidence from only ten individuals is an insuffi-
cient basis for determining appropriate investment goals.  Thus,
this Note recommends that individuals or organizations planning to
start a new fund first commission a professional market study.  To
raise the funds for this research, this Note recommends that the in-
dividuals and organizations planning to organize and operate the
new fund should first create a nonprofit corporation that could ob-
161. Survey from Jamie Kenworthy, Executive Director, Alaska Science and
Technology Foundation (2000) (on file with author).
162. 2000 Letter, supra note 160.
163. Id.
164. Id.
165. Id.  Many of the surveyed individuals felt that ASTF already serves the
needs of businesses that are seeking seed capital and that Alaska Growth Capital
fills the gap for other start-up investors.  Id.  While this may be true, Kenworthy
acknowledges that he personally knows all the individuals surveyed and that his
relationship with them may have influenced their responses.  Id.  Because ASTF
focuses entirely on technology businesses and Alaska Growth Capital does mostly
rural deals, this note suggests that seed and start-up capital deals are probably
being missed in the current market.  Id.
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tain funds from a foundation to conduct the market study.  Using
the structure of a nonprofit corporation could also be useful in later
stages of the fund’s creation, particularly to leverage resources to
provide technical assistance.
B. The Goals and Objectives for a Nontraditional Venture Capi-
tal Fund.
After conducting a systematic market study, Alaska’s stakeholders
will need to articulate what goals the new fund will seek to achieve,
particularly regarding financial return.  Generally speaking, the
unique nuances of the nontraditional venture capital model have
led to different schools of thought on the trade-off between eco-
nomic development benefit and rate of return.166  Some believe that
funds should focus on making investments in successful companies
with a high growth potential.167  This group believes that economic
development benefits will automatically flow from making compa-
nies stronger and more successful.168  Others believe that economic
development goals must be clearly articulated and pursued from
the beginning to ensure that particular outcomes such as job crea-
tion, wage levels, and job quality are actually achieved.169  Because
the majority of nontraditional venture capital funds have not been
operating for an extended period of time, there is a lack of quanti-
tative data regarding the long-term benefits or relative merits of ei-
ther strategy.  Fund managers and researchers from both schools
would agree, however, that determining which model to pursue is
essential at the earliest stages of creating a new nontraditional
fund, particularly to ensure that fund organizers and investors are
pursuing the same ends.170
166. See MARKLEY ET AL., supra note 86, at 7 (explaining opposing schools of
thought regarding investment goals for nontraditional venture capital funds).
167. Id.
168. Id.
169. Id.  For example, the Kentucky Highlands Investment Corporation prefers
not to use many restrictions for its investments because of the limited deal flow in
its nine-county Appalachian region; it also believes that any job creation is benefi-
cial in regions such as the one it serves, regions characterized by very high unem-
ployment and a large unskilled population.  On the other side of the spectrum,
Maine’s Coastal Ventures, LP (which invests in the entire state) prefers to invest
in companies with environmentally friendly practices and socially progressive
managers; it also requires companies to attempt to hire workers from specific
populations and to provide them with specific types of benefits.  RUBIN, supra
note 84, at 17.
170. MARKLEY ET AL., supra note 86, at 8.
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According to Kenworthy’s market study, none of the individu-
als who were interviewed thought that a new fund should mix eco-
nomic development objectives with a focus on obtaining a signifi-
cant return on investment, though one individual noted that some
sort of subsidy for technical assistance would be needed.171  This
view was based in part on the perception that funds that mix objec-
tives are always unsuccessful.172  As the previous analysis in Part II
suggests, however, creating a fund that seeks to achieve a more
modest return on investment while contributing to economic de-
velopment objectives can, in fact, be done.  Considering that Ken-
worthy and others already acknowledge that traditional venture
capital returns of thirty percent or more and traditional exit strate-
gies like an initial public offering are unrealistic in the current
Alaska market,173 this Note recommends that the developers of
Alaska’s new fund reconsider the possibilities for incorporating
economic development goals with a seven to fifteen percent return
on investment.
For example, one obvious investment objective of a new fund
should be to create a majority of deals within the state.  This type
of geographic restriction will influence the qualifications of manag-
ers or staff the fund hires (i.e., ones who have experience in
Alaska).  However, a new Alaska fund should not focus exclusively
within the state; it should make sure it can participate in deals in
other regions.  This serves two purposes.  First, this strategy en-
courages traditional or nontraditional funds from outside Alaska to
co-invest in Alaska-based deals if they think the Alaska fund may
one day do the same for one of their deals.  Second, this strategy
will provide an opportunity for the Alaska fund to boost its deal
flow or balance the risk in its portfolio.174
An additional goal of a new Alaska fund should be improving
the entrepreneurial culture within the state by providing technical
assistance.175  Nontraditional venture capital funds facing a limited
number of potential investment opportunities (because of geo-
graphic or social restrictions) may be more likely to invest in com-
panies with limited management experience than traditional
171. 2000 Letter, supra note 160.
172. Id.
173. Kenworthy interview, supra note 158.
174. Telephone interview with Deborah Markley, Principal, Policy Research
Group (Dec. 4, 2002).
175. See Marshall, supra note 157 (discussing Alaska’s historical lack of an en-
trepreneurial culture and the need for new business owners to receive hands-on
management assistance in addition to financing sources such as venture capital).
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funds.176  To compensate for the lack of experience within the busi-
ness, the venture capital fund may need to offer significant
amounts of technical assistance to increase the companies’ level of
knowledge and market readiness.177  Obviously, this can be a very
expensive proposition.  Some CDVCs have developed innovative
approaches to offset the costs of technical assistance.  For example,
a fund in California requires potential investees to go through a
Business Advisory Program run by experienced volunteer business
professionals.178  An additional benefit of improving technical assis-
tance may be the generation of increased deal flow to an area.179
Within the context of Alaska, the lack of quality of business man-
agement is a current barrier to entrepreneurial success; technical
assistance can provide training for less competent or experienced
managers.180
C. Creating the Fund: Capitalization.
While the optimal capitalization for a venture capital fund will de-
pend on the fund’s goals, structure, and sources of funding, the
amount of capitalization should also be related to the potential
deal flow. 181  Successful nontraditional venture capital funds are
typically capitalized with a minimum of $10 million.182  This amount
of capitalization allows funds to survive without a subsidy for oper-
ating expenses.  It would also allow the fund to make deals in the
$1 million range, which should meet the needs identified in Ken-
worthy’s survey.183
Because it is unlikely that any one investor, or type of investor,
has the capacity to capitalize such a fund on its own, the new
Alaska fund will need to attract several different investors.  Per-
haps the most obvious source of capitalization would be public
funds provided by either the state or federal governments.  As-
suming that political will to make investments in a nontraditional
venture capital fund exists, any new fund should first attempt to get
176. RUBIN, supra note 84, at 17.
177. Id. at 17-18.
178. Id. at 18.
179. MARKLEY ET AL, supra note 101, at 96 (describing an emerging fund in
Ohio that has an alliance with a technical assistance provider that helps local busi-
nesses become “venture capital ready,” refers businesses to the venture capital
fund, and provides follow-up assistance after financing; this alliance is thought to
help reduce investment risk and increase deal flow).
180. Kenworthy interview, supra note 156.
181. BARKLEY ET AL., supra note 107, at 9.
182. Id. at 16.
183. See Survey from Jamie Kenworthy, supra note 159.
111703 HOOPENGARDNER.DOC 12/29/03  2:02 PM
384 ALASKA LAW REVIEW [20:2
some portion of its capital from the state.184  While the individuals
surveyed by Kenworthy are hesitant to approach the state for
money to support a fund’s economic development objectives,185 the
state is the most likely source of patient capital, meaning the inves-
tor is least likely to require an immediate return on investment.
This is a significant advantage to using state revenue for a fund
hoping to achieve any sort of double bottom line.
If the state does participate as an investor, it should not be ex-
pected to bear all of the risk while the other investors only reap the
returns.186  That is, the state should not participate in any type of
CAPCO arrangement.  Because of the possibility of political influ-
ence, however, the state should not be allowed to participate as a
regular investor; rather, it should be expected to take some addi-
tional risk.  For example, the state could partially protect the return
of other investors by agreeing to take its portion of the return only
after the other investors receive a minimum return.  If the state
would be unwilling to take on some additional risk, perhaps it
could offer a one-time grant to help subsidize the fund’s economic
development goals.  For example, North Dakota’s governor has
proposed three new venture capital funds; one is a $10 million non-
traditional fund used to finance new and existing businesses with $3
million dedicated for technical assistance.187
In addition to state funds, the new fund may also want to ob-
tain federal funding through the SBIC program.  While there are no
SBICs currently licensed in Alaska,188 several individuals in Alaska
184. Granted, these are big assumptions.  Several factors suggest that the state
would be unwilling to put forth any money for this project.  First, Alaska previ-
ously invested several million in a venture capital fund that was unsuccessful and
is no longer seeking deals within the state.  While the state is supposed to get its
investment back, it will receive no return and no other benefits.  Second, the Per-
manent Fund—the most obvious place for the state to draw the money—is no
longer earning as much money as it was when the broader economy was booming.
See Kenworthy interview, supra note 156.
185. 2000 Letter, supra note 158.
186. Kenworthy interview, supra note 156.  In fact, another possible source of
capitalization should be the management of the fund itself.  By putting some of
their own capital in the fund, managers are more likely to keep the proper balance
between risk and return when making investment decisions.  This ensures that the
public sector does not bear all of the risk.
187. National Association of Seed and Venture Funds, North Dakota Governor
Proposes State Venture Fund,  at http://www.nasvf.org/web/allpress.nsf/pages5805
(Dec. 4, 2002).
188. Small Business Administration, at http://www.sba.gov/gopher/Local-
Information/Small-Business-Investment-Companies (last visited Jan. 20, 2003).
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would consider this option.189  There is also at least one individual
in Alaska who has previous experience operating an SBIC.190  Be-
cause of the minimum private capitalization requirements, how-
ever, this cannot be the only source of funds.  At least $2.5 million
in additional capitalization will need to be in place before the SBIC
licensing process can begin.  The capitalization for SBICs com-
monly comes from banks, but since there is only one state-based
bank left in Alaska, it is less likely that banks will play this role.
Therefore, other willing investors must be identified before this
strategy is pursued.
An additional source of potential federal funds is the New
Markets Tax Credit (“NMTC”) program.  This program provides
tax credits for investors who make equity investments in commu-
nity development entities that, in turn, make loans to or invest-
ments in qualified low-income businesses.191  As the first round of
tax credit allocations was just made in the spring of 2003, it is too
early to tell how effective this program will be in achieving its eco-
nomic development goals.  However, several of the entities that re-
ceived allocations in the first round plan to participate in nontradi-
tional venture capital investing.  For example, Coastal Enterprises
in Maine and the city of Phoenix in Arizona both plan to use the
NMTC program to create new venture capital funds.192  More im-
portantly, Alaska Growth Capital in Anchorage received an alloca-
tion of $5 million and may be authorized to use a portion of its al-
location for equity investing.193  Thus, this organization should be
approached as either a potential partner for a new venture capital
fund or as a source of capitalization if the goals of the new fund
meet the guidelines of the NMTC program.
189. Kenworthy interview, supra note 156.
190. Letter from Jamie Kenworthy, Executive Director, Alaska Science and
Technology Foundation, to Board of Directors, Apr. 2001.  This is important be-
cause meeting the SBA’s management requirements for SBICs can often be a bar
to licensing.
191. I.R.C. § 45D; see also CDFI Fund, at http://www.cdfifund.gov/programs/
NMTC/index.asp.
192. CDFI Fund, Allocation Profiles, at http://www.cdifund.gov/docs/2003_
nmtc_allocation_profiles_alpha.pdf.  The city of Phoenix has even found that sev-
eral traditional venture capital funds have expressed interest in participating in
their fund, even though the tax credit subsidy provided by the New Markets Tax
Credit program is relatively shallow.  The tax credit is viewed as an added en-
hancement to bring in additonal investors and to make investments that might not
have been previously considered.  Telephone interview with Lynda Dodd, New
Markets Tax Credit Coordinator, City of Phoenix (Oct. 27, 2003).
193. CDFI Fund, Allocation Profiles, supra note 190.
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A final recommendation for capitalization would be to seek
investment from the Alaska Regional Native Corporations.194  The
Regional Native Corporations (and their village corporation coun-
terparts) were created by the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act
of 1971195 through which Native Alaskans gained almost $1 billion
in cash and clear title to over forty million acres to settle all claims
based on aboriginal land claims.196  As a group, the Alaska Native
Corporations are the state’s largest private land owners, owning
twelve percent of Alaska lands.  The Corporations also own all or
part of 125 businesses and employ over 10,000 people.197  The fi-
nancial performance of the various Regional Native Corporations
has varied significantly from corporation to corporation, though on
the whole, it has been very poor.198  Since available capital is obvi-
ously not a concern for the corporations, it is becoming more ap-
parent that a lack of good management has led to most poor per-
formances.199
From the venture capital fund’s perspective, having one or
more of the Regional Native Corporations as an investor has sig-
nificant advantages.  The most obvious, of course, is the vast
amount of capital that the corporations can bring to the table.  An
additional advantage of Native Corporation investors might be
their ability to increase deal flow by recognizing opportunities
within their corporations or regions, particularly in the more rural
areas of the state.  Several factors about this new venture capital
firm may be attractive to the Regional Native Corporations as well.
For example, there is evidence that many Regional Native Corpo-
rations perform better economically when partnered with external
organizations.200  If the new fund has good management and a
mechanism for shared risk, this may appeal to the corporations.
Second, if the new fund could provide an additional return to a Na-
tive Corporation that refers a deal—a finder’s fee of sorts—this
might provide an added incentive.  Even without a finder’s fee, the
194. Kenworthy interview, supra note 156.
195. 43 U.S.C. § 1601-1629 (2003).  The corporations are all organized as for-
profit corporations (though the statute did allow for a non-profit model) with a
goal of providing economic and social benefit to their Alaska Native shareholders.
Id.
196. Id. § 1601(a); Steve Colt, Alaska Natives and the “New Harpoon”: Eco-
nomic Performance of the ANCSA Regional Corporations 2 (Feb. 2001), at
http://hosting.uaa.alaska.edu/afsgc/colt_newharpoon2.pdf.
197. LEASK ET AL., supra note 2, at 8.
198. Colt, supra note 194, at 2-3.
199. Id. at 53.
200. Id. at 34.
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prospects for helping create business that will in turn create more
jobs for their shareholders may also appeal to the corporations.
D. Mechanics of the Fund: Location and Management.
In the past, there has been a preference for Alaska to house the
branch offices of a fund based outside of the state instead of creat-
ing an Alaska-only risk capital institution.201  Given the unique
characteristics of potential deals within the state, however, creating
a fund that is primarily based in Alaska would be a better strategy.
Unless the outside fund is a nontraditional fund that is willing to
make the kinds of deals that Alaska needs—ones with a lower po-
tential rate of return, a greater need for technical assistance, and a
likelihood for deals in slower growth industries—Alaska businesses
are likely to get passed over for businesses located in other states.
An Alaska-based fund that is able to attract an experienced man-
agement team and is willing to make some deals outside of the
state will be better suited to meeting the state’s needs.
As for management, a new Alaska fund should be managed by
individuals who are experienced professional managers.202  This
means considering whether there are people already in Alaska who
are qualified to manage a fund that has the dual objectives of eco-
nomic development and achieving a decent return on investment.
If there are not willing and qualified individuals within the state,
people outside of Alaska will need to be identified.  Ideally, man-
agers from both inside and outside of Alaska should be hired to
staff the fund.  Because there are no nontraditional funds of this
nature currently operating in Alaska, it may be difficult to find an
in-state manager.  Therefore, an outside manager is likely to bring
additional investment skills that might be currently lacking within
the state.  An outside manager would also provide valuable con-
nections to other funds that may be able to make co-investments in
deals or provide follow-on financing.203  Finally, the fund should
look for managers committed to the same goals of balancing return
on investment with economic development objectives.204
201. See 2000 Letter, supra note 158.
202. Most nontraditional venture capital institutions have found that profes-
sional management was “critical to the success” of their funds.  BARKLEY ET AL.,
supra note 109, at 11; see also supra notes 92-100 and accompanying text for a
general critique of managing a fund with public employees.
203. 2000 Letter, supra note 158.
204. BARKLEY ET AL., supra note 109, at 8-9.
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V.  CONCLUSION
As a strategy for supplementing Alaska’s economic develop-
ment policy, Alaska should support the development of a nontradi-
tional venture capital organization.  Nontraditional venture capital
has proven to be a successful model for bringing risk capital to en-
trepreneurs in non-metropolitan areas outside of high tech corri-
dors.  Nontraditional venture capital also allows investors to
achieve a double benefit: a return on investment coupled with eco-
nomic development.  Several individuals and organizations in
Alaska have been laying the groundwork for a new fund for several
years.  Now is the time to put these plans in motion by building on
the knowledge base within Alaska and the lessons learned from
other states.
Merrill F. Hoopengardner
